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Agency Accountability Strategies After
Liberalization: Universal Service in the United
Kingdom, France, and Sweden
DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS
Liberalization of key network industries is often said to reduce accountability by
undermining its traditional mechanisms. Liberalization, others say, promotes
accountability by creating new channels and mechanisms. This article suggests
that neither view is sufficiently nuanced Accountability comes in many forms,
and the question is less "how much" accountability there is, but what form it
takes. And accountability will take different forms in relation to different issues,
even within the same organization. Examining accountability in relation to the
provision of universal service in electricity and telecommunications, this article
demonstrates that in the regimes studied, agencies were generally accountable
for providing universal service by deferring, to the maximum possible extent, to
political actors or stakeholders. However, when faced with an expert technical
question-in this case, determining the costs of the universal service-agencies
stressed their professional judgment and transparency. This observation supports
a wider hypothesis concerning the conditions under which a variety of agency
accountability strategies may be adopted
INTRODUCTION
Liberalization of network industries has been a key industrial policy in
many countries in the past twenty-five years. European Union (EU) policies
have been a key driver for liberalization amongst the EU member states,
even shaping patterns of liberalization in early adopter states such as the
United Kingdom. Policies of liberalization in the electricity and telecommu-
nications sectors in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and France have been
controversial, in part, because of the effects on traditional accountability
structures for public services. I suggest in this article that the question is not
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whether reforms increased or reduced accountability. Rather, the question
is what effect the reforms had on the form of accountability agencies use.
Agencies use different accountability strategies to deal with different issues,
depending on the extent to which an issue can be framed in professional-
technical terms and the extent to which it is politically controversial. The
article focuses on accountability for universal service, an issue that
liberalization opponents and consumer advocates are concerned will be
adversely affected by liberalization (Sauter 1998). The term universal service
refers to policies aimed at providing or facilitating access to telecommunications
and electricity services, considered by many essential services in modern
society. I focus on one set of these policies, providing services to customers
with low incomes, which involves politically sensitive decisions that may
have substantial redistributive consequences. In relation to determining the
scope of rules and processes that support affordable access to network
services, agencies are aware of the legitimacy problems they will face if seen
to make redistributive decisions. Under these conditions they prefer as
much as possible to defer to the political authorities and cast themselves in
the role of implementers. Where that choice is impossible, they make efforts
to share the responsibility by involving stakeholders in the decision making
and deferring to those decisions. Another dimension of the universal service
issue, how to fund universal service schemes, involves complex calculations.
The funding issue can be framed as a professional-technical question.
Consequently agencies take a very different approach, emphasizing their
own expertise and judgment, and this is reflected in the accountability strategies
that they adopt.
The first part of this article sets out the theoretical background. The
second part discusses the case study, universal service provision in electricity
and telecommunications sectors, and the methodology by which the study
was conducted. Findings from the case studies-the accountability strategies
used by the agencies-are presented in the third part. A concluding section
discusses the wider implications of the variety of agency accountability
strategies outlined in the article.
PART I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Market reforms of public sector services have been in vogue for several
decades now (Kettl 2000; Levi-Faur 2006; Peters 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert
2000; Smith 2001; Thatcher 2002a; Wyplosz 1999). Privatization and
liberalization of utilities sectors were among the most popular (Jamasb and
Pollitt 2005; Levi-Faur 2006; Victor and Dyer 1986; Waverman and Sirel 1997).
Scholars expressed a number of concerns in relation to such reforms. One
set of concerns focuses on the effect of such reforms on accountability. In
broad strokes, the literature can be divided into those strongly concerned
about the effect of such reforms on accountability and those (more or less
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cautiously) optimistic as to their effects on accountability. Those concerned
point out that market-style reforms weaken traditional mechanisms of
accountability and substitute the clear hierarchical structure of authority
and responsibility that existed before them for an undetermined, somewhat
chaotic new reality; they may also reduce opportunities for public participation
(Harlow 1998; Hood and Scott 2000; McGowan 2000; Minow 2003; Palast
Oppenheim and Macgregor 2003). A more optimistic view, however, sees the
reforms as contributing to accountability by providing additional market-
style mechanisms of accountability, increasing participation of various stake-
holders and transparency, and adding layers of accountability (Goldsmith and
Eggers 2004; Graham 2000; Hood and Scott 1996; Scott 2000; Thatcher
2002c; Trebilcock and Iacobucci 2003).
There are two problems with these studies. First, these evaluative studies,
except for a few exceptional works (Scott 2000; Stone 1995) underemphasize
the increasing complexity of the accountability situation facing administrative
agencies. This complexity is acknowledged by a respectable body of public
administration literature that describes the complex world administrative
agencies face, with multiple, often conflicting pressures to be accountable
and with demands to achieve many, often conflicting goals (Behn 2001;
Bovens 2005; Day and Klein 1987; Dubnick and Romzek 1991; Mashaw 2005;
Radin 2002). Scholars addressing the issue discuss several forms of account-
ability. The classic distinction drawn by Dubnick and Romzek deploys a
matrix distinguishing between internal and external sources of accountability
and between a high degree of control and a low degree of control, separating
accountability into legal, bureaucratic, professional, and political forms of
accountability (Dubnick and Romzek 1991: 77; Romzek 1987). However, in
real life, as acknowledged by several of these scholars, these forms are not
neatly separated. They overlap or conflict, and this frequently causes
problems (Radin 2002; Romzek 1987). An agency cannot respond only to
its political masters or only to judicial review or the rule of law. It is expected to
accommodate all of these, for different reasons. The question then becomes
how agencies handle conflicting and different pressures of accountability.
The problem is even more severe since agencies are nonmajoritarian actors,
they are not elected, and their decision making may be attacked as undemocratic
(Majone 1994; Thatcher 2002b; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). This
article asks how agencies address this complexity.
The second problem is that in attempting to evaluate accountability,
some studies treat the concept as uniform and as measurable, ignoring
conflicting meanings and possible forms of accountability. This study takes
the next step, by suggesting a classification of agency responses to accountability
pressures and an explanation of different choices.
My basic assumption is that agencies should be treated as sophisticated
actors facing a complex accountability situation. Agencies are not passive
"pawns," they have considerable political know-how and can manipulate
their political environment; therefore, their preferences need to be taken
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into account. Facing an array of complex accountability pressures and (as
is ever the case in public administration) constrained resources, they have to
find a way to handle the situation. This they do by adopting an accounta-
bility strategy, a set of behaviors and practices an agency uses to legitimize
its actions and justify its choices. These strategies can vary. Agencies can be
accountable, that is, legitimize and justify their actions, in different forms.'
Agencies are strategic actors, and since being "accountable" carries positive
benefits (and being "unaccountable" carries penalties), agencies want to
demonstrate that they are accountable and their behavior is legitimate. They
choose different forms to accomplish this.
An agency can justify its actions by stressing its expertise and emphasizing its
responsibility to act according to its best judgment, using a professional
judgment form of accountability. It can be accountable by still emphasizing
its expertise and professional judgment but providing much information
about its actions, in essence saying, "We are accountable because while we
have the authority and we make the decision, everything we do is out there,
and we are transparent." This is an information-based accountability strategy.
It can go a step further and say, "while the decision is still ours, we would
like to take into account stakeholders' views and change our behavior to
accommodate them." In this case, the agency is seeking legitimacy through
a strategy of responsiveness to the preferences of its stakeholder. Finally, an
agency can stress that it is not in fact responsible for policymaking. The
decisions themselves are made elsewhere; the agency is simply enforcing and
implementing them. It can legitimate its actions through an accountability
strategy of deference.
In addition, an agency may address a broad or narrow target audience.
The breadth of the target audience may substantially change its behavior.
When addressing a narrow audience, an agency may anticipate its preferences,
which may lead the agency to try and conform with those preferences, even
if is not being deferent (Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Seidenfeld 2001). If it has
to contend with many stakeholders with different views, the pattern of decision
making changes.
An agency may be addressing a narrow target audience, directing its
accountability strategy toward no more than one or two major actors; or a
broader target audience, a "medium" target audience, by aiming its accountability
strategy toward direct stakeholders but not beyond. Finally, it may aim at
addressing as broad a target audience as possible-in the Internet age, it
may direct its justification and legitimacy efforts toward whoever can get
access to its Web site. The two dimensions of accountability are shown
combined in Figure 1.
In this conceptual space, an agency can choose in which manner it will be
accountable, as well as the breadth of its target audience. Its behavior will
look different according to the choices it makes. For example, informing
only one actor of its actions (let's say, reporting to the minister who is
politically responsible for its action) looks very different than preparing a
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Figure 1. Accountability Strategies.
general report for public consumption for every one of its major decisions.
And both are very different than trying to defer to many actors simultaneously
or being accountable by saying, "We are just following the orders of the
democratically elected government." The combination of these choices will
be the agency's accountability strategy and will determine its accountability
behavior.
There is no direct literature on accountability strategies, but one can
draw on the studies analyzing differences in the implementation of administrative
reforms as well as on law and society studies and organizational behavior
for candidates to suggest explanations for variation among agency behavior.
Four hypotheses can be raised-though this study was not aimed at directly
testing them, focusing instead on generating theory. First, the difference in
accountability strategy can be accounted for by national factors, by the
national administrative or political culture, and the way liberalization worked
in the different countries (Thatcher 1999; Wilson 1989). Second, it can be
explained by the characteristics of the sector. Thus, if telecommunications is
characterized by a high level of competition and rapid changes, we would
expect different behaviors from agencies than in the electricity sector, which
is relatively stable and tends to oligopolies. Third, the accountability
mechanisms in place can explain the differences in accountability behavior.
Thus, an agency that has the obligation to consult before it makes a decision
will behave differently than an agency that does not. The availability of
appeal mechanisms will also make a difference.
All these factors are important to explain events in the liberalized sectors
and differences between the different agencies. However, they are insufficient
to explain differences in accountability behavior. The more convincing
explanation, both in light of my findings and in itself, is that accountability
behavior changes with the nature of the issue, or problem, the agency is
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dealing with. Intuitively, this makes sense-different actors are involved in
the discussion of different issues; and the same actors will have different
preferences in relation to different issues. Therefore, the coalitions addressing
different issues will be different, as will be the grid of pressures and
demands. In addition, studies in sociology and organizational behavior
have repeatedly shown that organizational behavior changes with the task
environment, with the nature of the problem, and with the coalition of
actors and preferences surrounding it (Kagan 2006; Ouchi 1979; Thompson
1967; Thompson and Tuden 1959). Similarly, in their study of decision
making by the British telecommunications regulator, Hall et al. (2000)
found different models of decision making across different issues.
Two aspects of the issue are important for the choice of accountability
strategy. The first is the informational aspects, in the term borrowed from
Epstein and O'Halloran's study of delegation of power (1999). This refers
to the level of information or expertise required to understand an issue. To
what degree is it an issue that requires professional or technical expertise?
To what degree is it a value-dependent issue? The distinction is fuzzy, especially
in areas where value judgment and professional questions are mixed closely,
like environmental decisions. And even issues that require a high level of
professional judgment usually require value judgments, and issues that
require substantial value judgments often have a knowledge or expertise
component. But it is a real enough distinction nonetheless. Designing the
technological specifics for a bridge, a nuclear plant, a telecommunications
system does not look the same as deciding whether to give the poor low-
cost electricity services or income supplement. I expect that the more an
issue requires expertise, the more an agency will internalize its responsibility
and stress its professional judgment. The less an issue requires expertise, and
therefore the more central are value judgments, the more an agency will
seek to externalize the responsibility and depict itself as the implementer, not
the decision maker. There are two reasons for that. First, an agency populated
by experts will be more comfortable making decisions based on expertise.
Second, agencies are aware of the criticisms aimed at unelected bodies
setting policy (Bickel 1962; Majone 1994, 1999; Thatcher 2002b; Thatcher
and Stone Sweet 2002). In issues requiring substantial value judgment, that
criticism is most powerful, and agencies will want to avoid seeming to make
such decisions as much as possible. In issues requiring expertise, agencies
can present their decisions as "professional decisions", not motivated by
values. Therefore, they will be less open to criticism for making decisions
that should be made by elected officials.
The other aspect of an issue that could affect the agency's accountability
behavior is how controversial is the issue. Agencies are, as I mentioned
above, strategic actors. In accountability terms, since accountability brings
positive rewards, we can expect an agency to want to be accountable and
not nonaccountable to as many actors as possible. On the other hand, since
agencies have limited resources, they would not want to spend more on
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Figure 2. Explaining Variation in Accountability Strategy.
accountability behaviors than they have to. Producing information costs
money, time, and manpower, as do holding hearings and consultations.
Therefore, an agency will address broader audiences where it anticipates or
faces challenges from more actors-on issues that are more politically
controversial.
These explanatory variables can be added to the figure addressing the
form of accountability, as presented in graphic format in Figure 2. This is
the model of agency accountability strategies.
PART II. THE CASE STUDY: UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
FRANCE, AND SWEDEN
METHODOLOGY
This article is part of a larger empirical project that examined the issues
of network price setting, creating retail competition, and universal service in
the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden, drawing on a large amount of
documentary material and open ended interviews with over 100 people. The
three countries were chosen since on one hand, they represent different
administrative and political traditions, and on the other, they share a
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common framework in EU law. Following Esping-Andersen's (1990)
classification, the United Kingdom is a "liberal" welfare state, France is a
"corporatist" welfare state, and Sweden a "social democratic" welfare state.
While Esping-Andersen focused on the countries' attitudes to welfare benefits,
his classification also captures important differences in public administration
and the relationship between important actors such as industry and labor.
England, France, and Sweden are substantially different in their approach
to social rights and markets, in addition to having different political and
administrative traditions. They are also at different stages of the liberalization
process, England being a pioneer in this area, Sweden an early liberalizer,
and France a relative late comer to liberalization. On the other hand, all
three countries are subject to EU regulation, which has increasingly set the
parameters for market liberalization and governance both in electricity and
telecommunications.
Thus, the three countries chosen allow for a mixture of differences and
similarities that makes comparison meaningful. Similarly, the two sectors-
electricity and telecommunications-are both utility sectors, but have very
different dynamics in terms of the rate of innovation and the feasibility of
competition (Bartle 2002; Graham 2000; Palast et al. 2003; Soult 2003;
Thomas 2004).
The issues-network price setting, creating retail competition, and universal
service-were chosen since they repeatedly came up in the literature, as well
as in consultation with experts in the field, as potential "problem areas" in
the liberalization process. For each issue, a large amount of written material
was collected, and interviewees were asked to narrate how agencies handle
them. I then constructed a narrative of the accountability behavior of the
agencies in relation to it. On each issue, my goal was to have information
on accountability behavior from three sources-what the agency said it was
doing (through interviews and agency documents); what others said it was
doing .(from interviews and documents produced by other actors); and what
its behavior demonstrated.
As this description demonstrates, this project was an hypotheses-
generating project. My goal was, through detailed case studies, to arrive at
an understanding of agency behavior. Future studies should add to the
discussion of accountability responses by introducing a quantitative research
design and testing the findings in countries beyond the EU and sectors
other than utility sectors.
WHY UNIVERSAL SERVICE?
In this article, I focus on one of these issues-universal service. In the past,
public policy concerning universal service referred mostly to geographical
coverage-a duty imposed, often on a single service provider, to serve all
customers within the country or region, whereever they were located within
it (Prosser 2000). But in the three countries researched, geographical
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coverage by the network was achieved by the time of liberalization or shortly
afterwards. This article focuses on the social aspect of universal service-the
treatment of those with low incomes and those having difficulties paying for
the service. I examine procedures for subsidizing certain users and for the
development of schemes for affordable use, particularly for those with low
incomes. Focusing on the social aspect of universal service makes this part
of the discussion an almost "purely" value-laden case study, since in rela-
tion to low-income customers, the distributional aspects are very obvious
and the role of technical expertise is minimal. In contrast, the funding
arrangements are complex and technical. Comparing the two allows testing
both extremes of the "informational aspect" axis of the model. I therefore
examine special programs to help low-income users to pay for services and
the funding for those special programs.
Universal service addresses access to the telecommunications and electricity
network. The premise underlying it is that in modern society, telecommun-
ications and electricity are basic services necessary to assure a minimal level
of quality of life. Therefore, as far as possible, barriers to access the network
should be removed. Obviously, this itself is a value judgment,' but beyond
that, mechanisms to allow access always involve some degree of redistribution
and resource transfers. Whether the focus is on having the same price
regardless of geographic location (with urban customers subsidizing rural
ones) or on having special programs for poor customers, someone is always
footing part of someone else's costs. Whilst there are a number of ways to
do this (including cross-subsidizing, direct subsidizing, or creating special
programs for certain categories of users), there are no professional criteria
to say what the right way to provide universal service is. It is always a value
judgment.
Furthermore, for those concerned with the democratic nature of adminis-
trative agencies, the concern will be the strongest in relation to redistributive
questions, as will the desire to control the agencies. Two of the explanations
used in Europe to justify making agencies independent is making a credible
commitment and the need for expertise (Gilardi 2002; Majone 1999; Thatcher
2002b; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). But that logic is weakest on these
redistributive universal service issues.
PART III. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN
THE THREE COUNTRIES
As explained above, my model suggests that an agency's choice of account-
ability strategy varies by issue and specifically depends on an issue's
informational aspects and the political controversy surrounding it.
In relation to universal service, since the issue is low on informational
aspects (i.e., cannot be addressed in professional terms), my model predicts
that agencies entrusted with universal service issues will want to transfer the
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responsibility elsewhere, to defer, if at all possible, to someone else's policy
judgment. Indeed, in my case studies, almost all agencies chose a deference
approach on these issues. Their ability to do so varied according to their
legal framework and the degree to which it expressly placed responsibilities
for dealing with universal service on the agency. But, within that framework,
agency members narrowed the areas for which they were responsible as far
as possible and stressed their deference to other actors. The one agency that
initially did not-indeed could not, since the law placed the issue squarely
within its responsibilities-still stressed its responsiveness to others and
later moved toward deference.
The one exception supports my argument. As explained above, my model
predicts that if an issue has strong informational aspects-that is, requires a
high level of expertise and can be framed in professional terms-an agency
will emphasize its professional judgment when dealing with it. In the
French case, both in electricity and in telecommunications, the law created
a funding mechanism for universal service. Assessing the costs of universal
service, unlike determining its contents, requires professionalism and
understanding of both technical and economic issues; in relation to funding,
both agencies took a very different approach than their approach to universal
service in general-emphasizing their professional judgment.
On the second dimension it addresses, the breadth of the target audience,
my model suggests that agencies direct that deference according to the level
of controversy surrounding an issue. That is, the more controversial an
issue, the more actors the agency will want involved in the decision making.
Again the data from the case studies supports the analysis in the model.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN SWEDEN
The law in Sweden was silent on the agency's responsibility for universal
service issues, and accordingly, the regulators found it very easy to point to
the government as the actor in charge. They expressly said: it is not our job,
taking an explicitly narrow deference approach. Since there were no political
pressures on the agency to act on universal service, they did not have to
broaden their target audience.
This meant that universal service was not extensively discussed by the
Swedish agencies-their approach was clearly defined and meant that the
issue, from their point of view, was invisible. For that reason, this discussion
is relatively short-but the invisibility of this issue, which is so controversial
in other countries, itself supports the claim that if possible, agencies transfer
responsibility for these issues elsewhere.
In telecommunications, the Swedish government explained its intention
toward universal service in its discussion of the new communications law:
"Universal services shall be available to everyone on equal terms throughout
the whole country and at affordable prices" (Ministry of Industry 2002: 9).
The agency interpreted this provision narrowly. Again and again interviewees
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that are members of the regulator stressed that universal service means, for
them, geographical coverage, that it has not been a large issue, and that
they did not have to deal with it.3 When asked explicitly about programs
for low-income consumers, an interviewee said that "that's none of our
business."'
In electricity too, the regulator saw universal service as focusing on
geographical coverage and not on providing services to consumers with low
incomes. When asked specifically about tariffs for customers with low
income, a prominent member of the regulator said:
We have no arrangements for people with low income.... We have no social
tariffs in Sweden, not at all. If you cannot pay your electricity bill-if you are
a poor family and need milk for your children, you cannot ask the store for a
price reduction because of being poor. If you are poor, you should rely on the
social welfare system, not the electricity market.'
The one obligation the government placed on electricity suppliers in this
context is in relation to disconnections. If a supplier disconnects a customer
for nonpayment, it has to notify the social welfare services in the local
community the customer belongs to. The assumption is that the social services
will, if necessary, step in.6 And as the regulator does not see this issue as
part of its job, there is no information on how common are disconnections
and how many families lack electricity.7
In other words, in Sweden, since the agencies are not forced to handle
universal service, they pass it on.
ELECTRICITY IN ENGLAND AND WALES
After being ordered by the government to become involved in universal
service issues, the electricity and gas regulators in England and Wales had
no choice but to do something. However, demonstrating the validity of the
model above, they went out of their way to use a strategy of deference,
either deference to government or to other actors. The strategies the agencies
used include emphasizing their responsibility to promote competition,
emphasizing the government's responsibility, defining their role narrowly,
and involving stakeholders in decision making.
After the Labor Government won the 1997 election, it asked the regulators
of electricity and gas at the time, Offer and Ofgas respectively, to prepare a plan
to help disadvantaged consumers. The result, a document titled "The Social
Dimension: Action Plan-Offer and Ofgas Proposals," was the first of a
series of Social Action Plan documents, under which Offer and Ofgas, and
after January 1999 the newly created Ofgem, explained their actions in relation
to fuel poverty.! The energy regulators-previous and present-have clearly
put a lot of effort into researching, thinking about, and acting on the issue.
All actors taking part in the political debate surrounding energy agree
that fuel poverty is an evil and should be dealt with-it is as consensual as
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"accountability is good" (I'd say motherhood and apple pie, but there is no
longer consensus that apple pie is good for you). Ofgem's position has been
that its primary role is to promote competition, which leads to lower prices.
By doing that, it contributes to the fight against fuel poverty. Repeatedly,
half or more of the decline in households on fuel poverty is attributed to
reduced energy prices-for example:
We have therefore been working to contribute to the Government's strategy by
keeping prices as low as possible... The draft Fuel Poverty Strategy acknowledges
the contribution which general price reductions have made, these being
responsible for 700,000 out of the 1 million households lifted out of fuel poverty
in England in the three years to 1999-the largest single cause of reducing fuel
poverty. (Letter by Callum McCarthy, Chariman of the Gas and Electricity
and Electricity Market Authority and Chief Executive of Ofgem, to Minister
of Energy, Brian Wilson Esq., MP, on September 14, 2001; repeated on other
occasions)
Ofgem accurately sees itself as only part of a network of organizations
working on combating fuel poverty and not necessarily the main one. The
main responsibility for combating fuel poverty belongs, in Ofgem's view, to
the government. Ofgem "contributes," "helps," compliments, and does its
share, but it is not primarily its job (Ofgem 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004a).
Ofgem paints itself as the "aide" and "implementer," not the policymaker.
Therefore, Ofgem's strategy in insuring its legitimacy is to clarify that: (1)
its main contribution toward fighting fuel poverty is to do its role as an
expert market regulator well and (2) it is not responsible for these issues
alone and to a large extent defers to other actors-the government first and
foremost, but as will be seen below, not only.
Ofgem did take primary responsibility in relation to those in debt-
especially in allowing them to participate in the competition. It also conducted
broad research projects as part of its social action plans (Ofgem 2001).
Both of these can be seen as areas where expertise has a role.
Ofgem also encouraged initiatives by industry to help low-income customers.
It did so by holding meetings with industry and expressing support for such
projects; by positive references to industry initiatives in its reports (Ofgem
2001), and in appearances before parliamentary Commissions. 9 Ofgem
encouraged industry response to the disconnection crisis in 2003, sending
industry members a cry for action (Ofgem 2004b). It encouraged industry
to take action to help customers on prepayment meters, while strictly refusing
to allow subsidized prices for them (interview, Ofgem). In addition, in
response to industry concerns, it published a report clarifying that special
schemes for low-income consumers are not illegal, removing a barrier-or
an excuse, depending on your point of view (Ofgem 2004c).
As predicted by the model above, when dealing with social issues, Ofgem
took a strong strategy of deference to other actors. It could not completely
ignore these issues, since government placed them squarely in its field. But
as far as possible, it equated its role in relation to social issues with its role
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in general. The best way to help vulnerable customers is to fulfill its job as
an economic regulator well-to encourage a free market that should lead to
lower prices; to promote competition by improving the chances to switch
and the information consumers have about switching; and to conduct
extensive research about the functioning of the market. Accordingly, it
objected to schemes that conflicted with that role, for example, lowering the
tariffs customers using prepayment meters have to pay. When pushed into
doing more, it declined the primary responsibility wherever possible. It
emphasized the government's duties and government's role in leading the
way on social issues. It put the burden on energy companies to set schemes
and initiatives that will improve the situation in regard to disconnections,
prepayment meters, and special schemes for low-income customers. It
reserved for itself the role of monitoring, studying, and administering the
programs others put in place.
Again, fitting the model, on issues that were not very controversial, such
as the energy efficiency commitment and fuel poverty in general, it stressed
its deference to government, a relatively narrow target audience. However,
on issues that became, or were, controversial, it widened the base it
addressed. Thus, on prepayment meters, it held workgroups that included
members of industry as well as consumer organizations. Similarly, when
disconnections became an issue, it addressed industry, but then consulted
extensively on industry's proposals and put pressure on industry to collaborate
with consumer organizations. It also made an effort to work with Energywatch
and involve them, with their stronger mandate as consumer representatives,
in their decision making.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM"0
The British telecommunications regulator, unlike the Swedish ones, was
charged with responsibilities for universal service in the law creating it.11
Unable to "pass the buck" through a strategy of deference, it did the next
best thing, stressing the responsiveness of its decision making. Fitting the
prediction that a larger array of actors will be involved in controversial
issues, a broad array of stakeholders was consulted. The role of political
actors-government and parliament-was limited to stressing the impor-
tance of universal service and pressuring Oftel to do something about it.'"
For more than ten years, the British incumbent, BT (formerly British
Telecommunications), has been required by Oftel to provide special
programs for consumers with low incomes.' 3 In addition, BT had to answer
to the regulator for disconnections. In both cases, the regulator achieved
those goals mostly through negotiations with BT (similar to the findings in
other areas of other studies of Oftel: Prosser 1997; Hall, Hood and Scott
2000; Thatcher 1999). As Don Cruickshank, Oftel's charismatic director
general from 1993 to 1998, said "the hope was 'to act on a voluntary basis
with the industry and with the education community to complement what
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they are doing already-because remember the cable industry are committed
to link-ups and BT are doing it unconditionally"' (House of Lords 1996,
chap. 5, para. 5.69). Consumer organizations were, however, unhappy with
the results, which they saw as underinclusive and put pressures on Oftel,
and now on Ofcom, to change the universal service provisions. Their
success has been limited.
Following its regular mode of operation, Oftel conducted its policy-
making process through "reviews" of the question (e.g., Oftel 1995, 1997a, and
2000). These followed the pattern of sending out a consultation document
to a large number of stakeholders (the incumbent (BT), other operators,
consumer organizations, and political actors); holding public hearings and meet-
ings; inviting written responses and addressing the comments made in them.
Throughout the process, Oftel consistently stressed its responsiveness to
stakeholders and committed to tailoring its behavior to suit their preferences,
thus legitimizing its actions by drawing on stakeholder support:
We would like your views. Please read the full Consultative Document if you
can-it contains the full details on all the complex issues. (Oftel 1995b, sec. 2)
Oftel's preference is to work with the industry to develop improved procedures
for outgoing calls barred service with agreed repayment plans as an alternative
to disconnection for debt. (Oftel 1997b, para. 4.5)
Not settling for the views of those organized enough to attend its hearing
and consultations, in March 2000 it carried out a survey of "unphoned" house-
holds (Oftel 2000). In addition, Oftel had a consumer panel discussing universal
service since 1995 (Oftel's Consumer Panel 1997). The reason for the panel's
creation was, in Oftel's words:
The DG wished to set up a small, independent group of consumer experts to
advise on the interests of residential users during the review of BT's price
control .... The DG felt that while business customers and the telecoms
industry were well organised lobbyists, it was more difficult to get effective
feedback from residential customers. (Oftel's Consumer Panel 1997, para. 2)
The Director General's (DG) expressed wish to be responsive to Oftel's
stakeholders, and his attempt to proactively engage in dialogue with them
is evident. In its report, the panel mentioned above pointed out several
instances where its advice had impact. For example, it believed that its
support of including an option to make outgoing calls in the low-cost
incoming calls service that BT was about to offer (later the In contact plan)
led BT to allow collect calls as part of the plan and led Oftel to simplify
some of its documents. So Oftel was not only paying lip service when it created
the panel, but actually intended to take consumers' views on board.
Besides seeking out views of stakeholders and expressly stating its
responsiveness, Oftel initiated a number of work groups that included
consumer and industry representatives to consult on universal service issues.
For example, one workshop was held in February 1996, and further workshops
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in summer 1996. Another was held later, to discuss universal service funding,
following BT's objections to Oftel's conclusions in 1997 (Oftel 1997a).
Oftel may have preferred to defer to government, but in this case the option
was not available: government washed its hands of the issue, addressing it
only to pressure Oftel to do something. Therefore, Oftel took action-but
went out of its way to act in consensus with the actors, and a wide range of
actors at that.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN FRANCE
Like the British case, the French telecommunications regulator was charged
with certain duties in relation to universal service. However, these duties
allowed it to define its role very narrowly, as implementer of government's
policy-and it did, expressly taking a strategy of deference.
France has had a tradition of public service, seen as providing basic services
citizens need for meaningful participation in social and political life, for
many years prior to liberalization (Cohen et al. 1997; Cohen and Henry 1997;
de Saint Marc 1996). One of the concerns voiced in relation to liberalization
was its effect on the public service (in the sense mentioned above); therefore,
the question of "service universel" (i.e., universal service) was in the forefront
from the start. The importance of universal service has led the French
government to create a funding mechanism for universal service, making
France one of the only two countries in Europe to do so. This means that
the French universal service operator-at this point still France T6lcom-
is recompensed for the costs of universal service via a fund to which all the
operators contribute. The French experience with funding universal service,
however, will probably not encourage other telecommunications regulators
to adopt a similar funding mechanism. Not only is funding the universal
service a very complex, work intensive process, but it has led to numerous
controversies and court cases between the regulator and the operators.
Interestingly, the French regulator, l'Autorit6 de regulation des t6l-
communications (ART14) had a dramatically different accountability strategy
when it comes to determining the benefits and conditions of universal
service than it had in relation to funding-even though in some ways, the
legal framework is alike. This behavior fits well within my model. Funding
universal service requires a high level of expertise. Accordingly, I expect an
agency to stress its professional judgment-as the French regulators of both
telecommunications and electricity did.
France offered a light user program and a subsidy to low-income customers. 5
ART clearly had a role in determining the sum of the subsidy, and it has some
leeway in determining the amount. In every case I examined, up to 2003,
the minister has always accepted ART's recommendation on the matter.6
Nonetheless, even though it still has an important influence on policy-
making and an important role to play, ART's accountability strategy in
relation to universal service decisions is clearly one of deference to political
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authorities. Government makes the law, and the law determines what goes
into universal service. After that is done, ART administers the law. ART
officials openly admit they have quite some leeway to administer the law.
But the major policy decisions are clearly made by government and then
embedded in law. ART applies the law. One member of ART said:
whatever is in the universal service is fixed in French law... there is a lot of
debate before you change the law on what should be and should not be and
how you should do that, we participate in the debate. Whenever it's voted by the
parliament my job is to run the factory's administrative side.17
In a speech about universal service given by Jean-Michel Hubert, the
President of ART in a colloquium chaired by (then) Prime Minister Jospin,
he explained the role of ART:
La politique publique trouve sa d6finition dans une d6cision de l'autorit6
politique, Parlement et Gouvernement; la r6gulation est l'une des composantes
de sa mise en oeuvre. (Hubert 1998)
Public policy is defined by a decision of the political authorities, Parliament
(referring to the National Assembly) and Government; the regulation is one of
the components of putting it into practice. (my translation)
Under the model above, this is not surprising. Determining what benefits
should be included in universal service is very much a value judgment.
There are no obvious answers or answers that can be reached through calcu-
lations or technical assessment. Accordingly, as in Sweden and England,
the agency would prefer to defer to the government. It is willing to administer
programs and implement rules but not to take responsibility for the major
policy decisions.
FINANCING THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE
France, as explained above, is unique in deciding to provide funding for
universal service. The French government made this value judgment
together with its decision to deregulate telecoms in 1997. And as explained
above, in relation to funding, the ART took a different accountability
strategy. Since funding is a complex issue that requires a high level of technical
expertise, that is not surprising.
The funding system was created in the initial law transposing the first
European directives about telecommunication liberalization, but only took
shape after the ministerial decree of 1997, setting the details. The decree
came into force in May 1997 after two consultations with the newly created
ART (ART 2006).
Like the rest of the French Universal Service rules, the scheme was
defined in quite a bit of detail in the law.'" A formula has actually been
specified for calculating the costs. As in relation to other tariffs, the Minister
of Industry was granted the authority to actually determine the costs of
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providing universal service and the formula for determining the contributions
collected from operators. Yet as in relation to other tariffs, the minister
regularly accepted ART's opinion.' 9
ART based its universal service calculations on assessing what are the
costs France T6l6com would not have if it did not have the universal
service obligation, that is, the universal service costs minus what France
T6lcom would be doing anyway.20 ART regularly publishes its decisions,
and it also details the information relating to the universal service calculations
in its annual report.2' Customers or customer organizations do not have an
input into this process, which is not a high priority for them.2
While the process was never simple, ART managed universal service rela-
tively smoothly in the first years: costs were assessed, the minister approved,
and there was little pressure on ART to change its methods. ART was
meeting its demanding deadlines.
This changed following the December 2001 decision of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), which found the whole funding scheme illegal under
EU directives, forcing the French government to substantially overhaul the
system. The rules for funding universal service had to be changed, the
calculations for 1998, 1999, and the subsequent years had to be redone, and
companies started regularly appealing universal service decisions.
In a context where a funding decision has to be made every year, and
where the funding decision itself is complicated and labor intensive, ART's
job in relation to universal service became very difficult. ART itself pointed
out, in discussions toward rewriting the decree relating to funding universal
service following the ECJ's decision, that the changes, although inevitable
following the ECJ ruling, will lead to complicated, awkward, and controversial
calculations.23 In the years following the rulings, in the assessment of a
member of ART, every decision they made in relation to universal service
was appealed before the Conseil d'Etat.24 Operators have a clear interest in
bringing such cases: if their argument is accepted, they will not have to pay
until a new calculation is made, and they may end up paying less. While
many of the cases are rejected,25 some are accepted,26 creating upheavals in
the system and requiring substantial work. This meant ART was facing
substantial uncertainty in relation to funding universal service.
ART'S ACCOUNTABILITY STRATEGY IN RELATION TO FUNDING
If determining the contents of universal service is very much a value judgment,
assessing the costs for those contents and the contributions of each
operator seems like a professional question. The formula is defined in the
law. ART's role is to evaluate the costs submitted by the universal service
operator, which requires both technical and economic knowledge (and a lot
of work). On the other hand, one of the components in determining
funding is the estimated benefits to the universal service provider from
providing the service. There are no real numbers for those benefits-ART
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has to decide on them, and there are no real professional criteria.27 Therefore,
while funding is much closer to being a professional issue than the contents
of universal service, it still requires some value judgments. Under the model
we would expect, therefore, that ART would use an accountability strategy
of information in relation to universal service funding. This is indeed
supported by the data.
From the start, ART held extensive consultations and provided substantial
information on its decision-making process (ART 1997a, 1997b). On the
other hand, all its documents are very authoritative, rather than responsive.
The ART decides, based on its own judgment.28
In interview a member of ART explained that "In terms of calculating
[universal service's] cost, paying for its cost, . . . -we have pretty much full
powers to applying what the law has said".29
ART is not responsive on this issue, and does not defer to other actors.
Instead it is accountable by being transparent, by presenting what it does to
full view, enabling others to take measures against its choices. While it acts
within the law, it stresses not the constraints the law puts on it, but the
powers it has within that framework.
ELECTRICITY IN FRANCE
France's sophisticated array of aid to electricity customers who have
troubles paying their bills is not run by the electricity regulator, the
Commission de regulation de l'6nergie (CRE). The CRE's approach to
benefits is clear and well within the model-it is the government, together
with tlectricit& de France (EDF), the state-owned company, that determines
universal service benefits. The CRE defers to their preferences. CRE is very
clear on the issue-helping vulnerable clients is not its job. It is someone
else's responsibility. Its role is confined to giving an opinion on the effects
of the rules on competition. Accordingly, and as predicted, it takes an
accountability strategy of deference.
However, in relation to funding, it takes a different accountability
strategy-like ART, stressing its professional judgment.
EDF has a substantial range of programs to help vulnerable customers
afford their electricity bills, which goes beyond the scope of this article
(EDF 2003).3" Besides these programs, Article 4 of the law transposing the
EU directives about electricity liberalization ordered the creation of a social
tariff (Law No. 2000-108). However, the article was not implemented for
several years.3" On May 13, 2002, the CRE was asked to give its view on a
social tariff proposed by the government. In its opinion, CRE basically said
that they have nothing against the government's proposed tariffs and have
"aucune observation a formuler," no views to offer, except on the effect of
this tariff on competition.32
The CRE clearly transfers the responsibility for defining universal service
conditions to the government. "It's not us." The CRE will carry out whatever
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specific mission the government wants in relation to universal service, as it
does in relation to funding. But it will not get involved in the thorny
political issue of defining the terms.
FUNDING UNIVERSAL SERVICE
CRE does not see itself as having a role in determining the universal service
terms; but it sees itself as having a substantial role in funding that service.
The funding system in electricity is very different from that in telecommun-
ications in ways that mean that the CRE faces a lot less problems than the
ART and can adhere to a much more professionally based accountability
strategy. Accordingly, and following the model, CRE took a professional
judgment based approach to its accountability.
A funding mechanism has been set in Article 5 of the Law of February
10, 2000. The monies in the fund were collected from the customers
through an addition to their electricity bill. The amount each operator was
allowed to collect from its customers was proposed by the CRE and
approved by the ministers.
The advantage of this mechanism over the one used in telecommunica-
tions was that while a direct fee from the operators is strongly felt by a con-
centrated, resource-rich group of actors, who have both the incentive and
the ability to resist it strongly, when included in the bill, the fee is spread
over a diffuse group of customers, and for each of them, the amount is not
worth fighting over (Percival 1998; Stewart 1988; Wilson 1980). There were
therefore a lot less conflicts regarding the universal service contribution in
electricity than in telecommunications. In addition, in energy, there is no
discussion of benefits, and the amounts are defined as strictly the costs of
the universal service. Assessing the costs is a professional, technical ques-
tion.33 There is therefore much less room for value judgments, and much
more of a professional/technical question-how do you assess the costs?
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that CRE had an almost pure professional
judgment approach when determining the universal service costs, a member
explaining: "c'est la CRE qui propose au gouvernement le montant de cette
taxe." "CRE suggests to the government the amount of the [universal service
contribution]."' And the way they do it? "On regard les comptes de l'op~rateur
et effectivement on fait une proposition." "We look at the operator's accounts
and propose the amount."35 This has been CRE's position consistently (CRE
2003, 2004, 2006).
CRE's decisions include reference to the annexes that included the
detailed calculation it went through. But no public consultations were held;
no detailed explanations were given. The CRE is not hiding what it is
doing; but it is not claiming accountability because of its transparency.
Instead it demands trust because of its expertise. This pattern has been
repeated in other decisions. The decisions are always short, and detail num-
bers, without explaining how the agency actually got to them. They are
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very authoritative in nature. The agency here is choosing to justify them by
relying on is expertise, rather than transparency or deference.
PART IV. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The first implication of the above analysis is that it is not only those
concerned about the lack of legitimacy inherent in nonmajoritarian insti-
tutions deciding redistributive policies that do not want agencies to decide
distributive or redistributive policy. This study suggests that agencies
themselves would also rather not make those kinds of decisions. Agencies
worry about the lack of good professional criteria to justify decisions. While
professional criteria are often not value free (for example, economic
criteria may include a bias toward economic efficiency as opposed to
distributive justice), they give agency officials clear standards to use and
allow them to justify the decision based on expertise. Issues that are clearly
value laden do not allow them this protection. In addition, agencies are
aware of the concerns about their legitimacy and would prefer that distributive
decisions be made by elected officials. This clearly fits the predictive model
described above. As expected, in all these cases the agencies-well aware of
the legitimacy issues associated with universal service-did their best to
limit what they were responsible for and place as much emphasis as
possible on government's role in making policy. The ability of agencies to
do that varied from country to country. In Sweden, where the law does not
even mention universal service, the agencies simply stated that universal
service was in no way their responsibility; in the United Kingdom and
France, where the agency has clear statutory-prescribed responsibilities in
this area, it was not as simple. However, whatever the law said, agencies
were careful to specify their responsibilities in this area in ways that gave
them a relatively narrow, implementer role. Within that role, the agency
still did its best to transfer or spread responsibility. On the other hand, in
determining the costs of universal service, the French regulators behaved
very differently. In relation to funding, the agencies' accountability strategy
was much closer to the professional judgment end of the continuum, as
expected for an issue that has strong professional aspects. They did not
have the same concerns as in determining the benefits.
One question left is how generalizable is this finding. Would this be true
also in relation to agencies whose main goal is to deal with social benefit
issues? At least one study, of the U.S. Social Security Administration
suggests that it, too, frames issues in ways that avoid making redistributive
decisions regarding social benefits (see Mashaw (1983), where the three
approaches to the agency's task were bureaucratic rationality (efficiency),
professional treatment, and moral judgment translated into applying the
rules correctly and giving the benefits to those that deserve them). But
clearly more research into this question is required.
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Beyond the issue of universal service, this study raises broader questions.
The findings above support the arguments that accountability can take
different forms and that accountability behavior varies by issue. This has
important implications to the discussion of accountability.
In the modern world, accountability is something everyone claims they
want (Behn 2001; Bovens 2005; Dubnick 2002; Dubnick and Romzek 1991;
Harlow 2002; Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Policymakers work at ensuring
agency accountability. However, this study suggests, they are not considering
possible contradictions between different forms accountability can take. If
an agency is accountable through being transparent, emphasizing its
expertise, it is not being deferential. Criticizing it for failure to defer to
other actors ignores the fact that it is accountable, only in a different way.
And not considering the form of accountability means that policymakers do
not consider what form of accountability they desire. Instead of discussing
in which cases an agency should be deferential to its political masters and in
which cases expertise is more important, the term "accountability" is brandished
about as if generally discussing it solved problems.
Much like trade-offs between policy goals, policymakers need to consider
and take into account trade-offs between different forms of accountability,
and between those forms and the purpose of the agency. If certain issues
were given to an agency to be determined by expertise, responsibility to
stakeholders is not necessarily a value (and in fact raises concerns of
capture). Similarly, if the goal of creating an agency is creating credible
commitments (Gilardi 2002; Majone 1999; Thatcher 2002b, 2002c), the
agency needs independence, and demanding that it defer to politicians is
self-defeating. Accountability through information and transparency can
solve the dilemma between accountability and independence (Majone 1994).
On the other hand, if an agency is created with the express purpose of
implementing a social goal desired by the political masters, it should defer
to the political will and not exercise its own judgment. These are the situations
in which we have a principal-agent problem and where discussion of solving
it is meaningful (DeShazo and Freeman 2003; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast
1987, 1989). The form of accountability used should affect the demands
that can be legitimately aimed at the agency. An agency accountable through
information and transparency can be attacked for not being transparent, but
it is inconsistent to attack it for not deferring to the political authorities.
Unsuitable expectations can be ineffective, or have negative consequences,
demoralizing agency officials and leading to defensive behaviors (such as
those created by too much regulation in Bardach and Kagan's study (1982)).
In the extreme case, lack of distinction between forms of accountability
means that an agency will be expected to be accountable in all the different
ways at the same time. Since these demands contradict each other, an
agency will fail inevitably to comply with some of them. This could lead to
a situation where accountability means nothing but punishment Behn
(2001). However, many calls for accountability desire ex-ante control, not
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just ex-post blame. Punishing the agency whatever it does will not achieve
that goal.
In addition, the form of accountability may affect the outcomes. The
degree to which an agency responds to stakeholders will naturally affect
who wins and who loses. It affects an agency's susceptibility to capture,
though the exact effect needs to be thought about further. On one hand,
responsiveness, in an area where there is no strong interest group and
industry is the strongest actor, can lead to capture; on the other, if all experts
are bound to industry in some way, so can a strategy of professional
judgment. In areas where expertise is important, the accountability strategy
may also determine whether the results will actually be achieved. Going back
to the Challenger tragedy, Romzek and Dubnick's (1987) study suggests
that in relation to when should a spaceship take off, professional considera-
tions should be primary, and an agency should be allowed to act according
to its best judgment-and maintain transparency so it can be caught if it
"runs away." A different approach can lead to a spaceship exploding, a
result desired by no one. The only way to achieve results on issues that require
a high level of expertise is to leave them to experts. On the other hand, in
relation to determining the level of benefits given to low-income people, an
agency should defer to its political masters since how a country treats its poor
is a question best handled by the political process. Either of these propositions
can be challenged, but the questions of which form should accountability
take should at least be discussed and considered. At present, they are not.
Finally, this model suggests that there is a limit to the degree outsiders
can affect an agency's accountability strategy. If an issue is clearly profes-
sional, an agency will usually not defer to others in relation to it. The legislator
can take an issue out of an agency's hand at times by detailed legislation or
transfer to another agency, courts can order it to do or not do certain things
(though it is doubtful whether courts will, if it is a very professional issue-
they are more likely to add in procedural mechanisms and affect decision-
making processes (Graham 2000; Scott 1998; Shapiro 1988)). Barring that,
though, an agency will be accountable through professional judgment or
through information, but it will not be very responsive to stakeholders'
preferences and will not defer to another actor (and as I suggested above,
that is not necessarily a negative thing). How can an agency's strategy be
changed in this case? One way to do so is to force it to consider arguments
beyond the professional ones and try and transform the issue definition into
a value-laden question. For example, a change in agency personnel can do
so; adding environmentalists to forestry agencies that had been populated by
timber experts can inject additional values into the discussion. Outside actors
can emphasize the nonprofessional aspects of an issue and make sure the
agency addresses them. But the strategy to use is one attacking the issue
definition, not one demanding that the agency defer to others.
On the other hand, increased participation can almost always be attained
by putting political pressure on an agency, which will lead it to increase its
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target audience-publish information more broadly, include more actors in
discussion, listen to more actors. Is that desirable? As pointed out by Shapiro
(1988) and Kagan (2001), the ability of many actors to participate can lead to
deadlocks, bad policy results, a costly and lengthy decision-making process,
or distortion of the policy-making process. Other scholars (Fung 2006; Graham
2000; Hirst 1994), though, as well as some of my interviewees strongly believed
that an inclusive policy-making process can lead to better decisions, since it
produces more information and enables to take everyone's preferences into
account.36 The concern that too much accountability can be paralyzing can be
met by recognizing that there is a whole menu of different strategies of
accountability, some more appropriate for certain policy issues than others.
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NOTES
1. To paraphrase and adapt the definition of accountability used by cognitive psycho-
logists (see Lernerand Tetlock 1999: 255), accountability is the "implicit or explicit
expectation that one may be called on to justify one's beliefs, feelings, and actions
to others.., also usually implies that people who do not provide a satisfactory
justification for their actions will suffer negative consequences ranging from
disdainful looks to loss of one's livelihood, liberty, or even life... Conversely, people
who do provide compelling justifications will experience positive consequences."
2. But one that has been accepted by the European Union, which addressed
universal service as part of both its telecommunications and electricity reforms.
3. Interviews, PTS and STEM.
4. Interview, PTS.
5. Interview, STEM.
6. Though a consumer representative claimed that the actual treatment by the social
services varies from locality to locality, and some do not handle it well. Interview,
Customer ombudsman. There is, however, no indication on whether this is a
problem and if it is, how widespread it is.
7. Whether because the other mechanisms are effective enough to make such pro-
vision unnecessary, or because of the strong belief of the Swedish electricity regulator
and ministry in market mechanisms in relation to the electricity sector, is unclear.
8. In England, the question of universal service in energy is dealt with under the
heading of "fuel poverty." Fuel poverty relates to households that have to pay
more than 10% of their income on energy to achieve accepted standards of
heating. Studies pointed to tens of thousands of winter deaths from cold, due to
poorly heated houses (Offer and Ofgas 1998).
9. Though in this context without mentioning specific schemes. See, for example,
the appearance of Callum McCarthy, John Neilson, and Virginia Graham from
Ofgem before the House of Common's Select Committee on Trade and Industry
on Thursday 23 May 2002, answer to question 196.
10. My focus is on Oftel since in the time of research Ofcom was new and still feeling
its way on these issues.
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11. One of the Director General's primary duties was to. "secure that there are
provided throughout the United Kingdom ... such telecommunications services
as satisfy all reasonable demands for them including, in particular, emergency
services, public call box services .... and services in rural areas" (art. 3 (1)(a) of
the Telecommunications Act, 1984). One of the secondary duties is "to promote
the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users in the United Kingdom
(Including, in particularly, those who are disabled or of pensionable age) in
respect of the prices charged for, and the quality and variety of, telecommunications
services provided" (art. 3 (2)(a), Telecommunications Act, 1984).
12. "The hon. Gentleman said that the proposals would prevent the poorest from
signing up. He ignores the new scheme being introduced by BT to spread the cost
of signing up and, therefore, make it easier for people to do so" (House of
Commons Hansard Debates for March 5, 1991, in response to a question
attacking the effect of liberalization on access). "5.64 The Information Society is
not an exclusive club. Every British citizen should be able to become a member.
In the long term, the aim must be that a majority of homes will have access to
the Information Superhighways, perhaps via a low cost, low memory terminal or
a television set-top box. But until this ideal is achieved, and, indeed, as a
necessary stage towards achieving widespread knowledge, skills and use of IT,
special arrangements will need to be made for public access" (House of Lords,
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1996, chap. 5, para. 5.69). See also
Hall, Scott and Hood (2000: 78, 92), in their discussion of universal service,
describing how the political masters stepped in to take control when Oftel was
not living up to their standards and how Oftel had to negotiate with both the
ministry and consumer organizations on the issue.
13. BT offered a number of special low priced schemes, including the Light User
Scheme (LUS), First offered at the end of 1993 and included in BT's license as
Section 24d and In Contact, Initiated in 1998, but take up remained low until the
introduction of In Contact Plus in April 1999. Customer organizations criticized
these schemes on two important grounds. First, low use-which these programs
reward-is an imperfect proxy for low income. Some vulnerable consumers need
to use the phone quite heavily. They may be housebound and depend on the
telephone for connection with the outside world; or they may be minorities with
many relatives abroad (Klein 2003). Second, neither program is particularly
generous. For LUS, the rental charges (the monthly fee paid for the line) are not
reduced, and the program places a heavy limit on what the customer can use. In
Contact had a low joining fee and reduced rental charge, but the initial program
did not include outgoing calls (except to emergency numbers) and with In
Contact Plus, where the customer can buy a calling card to call out, the price of
calls is higher than the regular price.
14. Today, it is l'Autorit6 de Regulation des Communications Electroniques et des
Postes (ARCEP). I am using the name under which it was known at the time of
the field research.
15. The first program started before liberalization. In 1994, when the price of the line
was raised, France T616com created a special program called "ligne A faible
consommation" (Line for Low Usage) which offered low users a reduction equal
to 13-38% (varied by geographic area) of the price of subscription. ART's role
here was to advise the minister, but it did not initiate any of the plans and did
not supervise their implementation. In 1999, the telecommunications code was
changed by a government decree, creating a scheme for low income customers.
Those customers were defined in some detail in the decree: "Les personnes
physiques qui ont droit au revenu minimum d'insertion ou qui perqoivent
l'allocation de solidarit6 sp6cifique ou l'allocation aux adultes handicaps ... les
invalides de guerre cumulant le b6n6fice des articles L. 16 et L. 18 du code des
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pensions militaires d'invalidit6 et des victimes de la guerre dont les invalidit~s
supplkmentaires sont 6valu~es A 10 % pour le calcul du complement de pension
pr~vu A l'article L. 16 dudit code, les aveugles de guerre b~n~ficiaires de l'article
L. 18 du code prcit6 et les aveugles de la Resistance b6n~ficiaires de l'article L.
189 du mme code"-that is, real people (not corporations) eligible for minimum
income supplement or several other social benefits and wounded veterans (Decree
99-162). The new scheme meant that those eligible ("ayants droit"), would have
a certain sum, determined annually by the minister following an avis (i.e., an
opinion-in effect, a recommendation) from ART, deducted from their monthly bill.
16. ART's recommendation for 2001 (ART 2001) was accepted on February 28,
2001. ART's recommendation for 2002 (ART 2002a) was accepted in February
2002; ART's recommendation for 2003 was accepted in February 2003. These
last are also from ART (2006).
17. Interview, ART. Emphasis added.
18. See Article R. 20-32 du code des postes et t~lkcommunications.
19. Interview, ART. Table comparing Minister's decisions to ART's initial
recommendation with author.
20. Interview, ART. To do this, it created thirty-five categories of localities in France
based on popular density, and assessed where it is profitable for France T6lecom
to operate and to what degree. The difference between the actual universal
service costs and the amount France T6l6com would invest anyway is the net
cost. Then, ART assesses the benefits France T6lcom gets from being the universal
service provider and subtracts that from the sum. The costs are placed on operators
according to a formula that grants them a certain deduction (so that small operators
end up not paying at all). Initially, it was based on the volume of calls an operator
has, but since 2003, the assessment is according to the income operators have (after
a certain calculation). France T6l6com also contributes and is in fact the largest
contributor to the fund. Until the change of method in 2003, Internet service
providers who did not have a fixed line network were not contributing to the fund.
21. Interview, ART.
22. Interview, ART.
23. ART, 2002b: "exprime nkanmoins defortes rkticences 6 ce que l'on s'engage sans
possibilitj de retour dans la voie de calculs compliquks, faisant appel d une
procdure particuliirement lourde et contestable."
24. Interview, ART.
25. E.g., Statuant au contentieux Nos. 250608, 250613 Societe Tiscali Telecom
Decided by the Conseil d'Etat on 18 June 2003; 1 April 2005, 250645, Societe
Reunionnaise Du Radiotelephon; 1 April 2005, 250644, Societe Franqaise Du
Radiotelephone (SFR); 1 April 2005, 250643, Societe Cegetel; 1 April 2005,
250614, Societe Louis Dreyfus Communication; 1 April 2005, 250612, Societe
Ventelo France; 1 April 2005, 250611, Societe Kaptech; 1 April 2005, 250610,
Societe Belgacom Telecom France; 1 April 2005, 250609, Societe 9 Telecom; Al
April 2005, 250572, S.A. Bouygues Telecom; December 5, 2005, 257683, S.A.
Bouygues Telecom; December 5, 2005, 257747, L'association Franqaise Des
Operateurs De Reseaux Et Services De Telecommunications (AFORS T6lcom);
5 December 2005, 257686, Societe Cegetel, Ociete Fran~aise Du Radio
Telephone (SFR), Societe Reunionnaise Du Radio Telephone (SRR); 12 December
2005, 262646, Societe Franqaise Du Radiotelephone (SFR).
26. 11 April 2005, 251239, Societe Franqaise Du Radiotelephone (SFR), La Societe
Reunionnaise Du Radiotelephone, La Societe Cegetel Et La Societe Bouygues
Telecom; 12 December 2005, 252659, S.A. Bouygues Telecom; 28 December
2005, 250656, L'association Franqaise Des Operateurs De Reseaux Et Services
De Telecommunications.
27. Interview, ART.
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28. "L'Autorit6 est chargre d'6valuer le coOt net des diffrrentes obligations de service
universel et les contributions des oprrateurs au fonds de service universel. Le
ministre charg6 des trlrcommunications, sur proposition de l'Autorit6, constate
ces montants." Interview, ART.
29. Interview, ART.
30. Interview, EDF.
31. The explanation suggested by a number of French interviewees is a political one;
when the 2000 law was passed, the government in place was the socialist government
headed by Jospin; that government lost its power in 2002 and was replaced with
a center-right government of UMP. That government did not seem in a hurry to
implement the article. However, that does not explain why a social tariff was
not set between 2000-2002 when the Jospin government was in place; nor does
it explain why a social tariff in telecommunications was put in place much
earlier.
32. "Dans le cadre de sa mission de regulation, la CRE examine les tarifs qui lui sont
soumis pour avis au regard des r~gles de concurrence et de bon fonctionnement
du march6. Le coot du dispositif prrvu par le projet de drcret 6tant support& par
les consommateurs non eligibles n'en brnrficiant pas, la CRE n'a aucune observation
A formuler .... ce projet de drcret prrcisant strictement les conditions de mise en
oeuvre de 'article 4 de la loi du 10 fevrier 2000, la CRE emet un avis favorable."
"As part of its regulatory mission, CRE examines the tariffs submitted to its
review in relation to the rules of competition and the good functioning of the
market. As the cost of the arrangements suggested by the decree is supported by
non-eligible consumers who are not benefiting from competition, CRE does not
have any observation to make. .. , as the decree adheres strictly to the terms set
in article 4 of the law of February 10, 2000, the CRE gives a favorable opinion"
(my translation).
33. See CRE's explanation page to operators: Mrcanisme de la CSPE, available at
http://www.cre.fr/operateur/mecanisme.jsp.
34. Interview, CRE.
35. Interview, CRE.
36. Interviews, Ofgem. Interview, Ofcom. Interview, NCC. Everyone here, of course,
is everyone who took part in the discussion, not all interested parties.
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